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INTRODUCTION

"When the average person hears a story of a mom who failed to
protect a child, their instinct is that she doesn't deserve to have a
child. But, we don't get to decide that for her." 1 This statement,
1. Posting of Dan Slater to The Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2008/09/25/less-child-abuse-fewer-criminals-sizing-up-a-no-pregnancy-order/
(Sept. 25, 2008, 12:21 EST).
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made by a prosecutor in the case of Felicia Salazar, epitomizes the
feelings of many legal scholars throughout the country and the holdings of many courts as well. However, Judge Baird in Travis County,
Texas did just what the prosecution said he could not. And with no
objection by Felicia Salazar, the offender in the case, Judge Baird's
order stands. Salazar was sentenced to community supervision for ten
years, one of her conditions being that she is not allowed to have any
more children.'
This Comment focuses on the ability of a judge to limit the fundamental rights of a probationer through the imposition of probation
conditions; more specifically, the ability of judges to limit the fundamental right to procreate. Although courts across the nation are split
on the issue, Texas courts could have addressed this as recently as September 2008 when Salazar's case came before the Travis County court.
But, with no objection, and consequently no appeal, the trial court's
order will stand as issued.
This Comment will start with a brief history-the history behind the
fundamental right to procreate and the history of probation throughout the country, first looking at the federal system and then the state
systems in general. This Comment continues by examining how the
courts across the nation have treated the issue of limiting the fundamental right to procreate. Because Texas has no established precedent examining the constitutionality of conditions of probation that
limit the right to procreate, cases that limit other fundamental rights
will be examined to see if a natural analogy can be made. Finally, this
Comment will conclude with an analysis of how Texas courts should
treat the issue when faced with it in the future. And realistically, they
will definitely have that opportunity.
II.

THE ROOTS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE

It has been almost 50 years since the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the fundamental right to privacy exists implicitly in
the United States Constitution.3 Griswold v. Connecticut involved a
medical clinic that gave information on the use of birth control to
married people.4 The distribution of the material violated statutes
that limited the ability to make personal contraceptive decisions.5
Upon review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court struck down the
law and held that there is a zone of privacy that is implied in the First,
2. Posting of Dan Slater to The Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.
wsj.com/law/2008/09/12/can-a-judge-order-a-woman-to-stop-having-childen/ (Sept. 12,
2008, 13:38 EST).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Id. at 480.
5. See id.
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Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amendments contained in the Bill of
Rights.6
Although Griswold was pivotal in the establishment of the right to
privacy, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right to procreate in a
decision handed down over 20 years before in the case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma.7 Even though the decision was based on equal protection
grounds and not a fundamental rights analysis, the Court stated that
"marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the [human] race."8 This very statement has long been regarded as the point in which the courts determined that the right to
procreate qualifies as a fundamental right protected under the United
States Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court later examined the fundamental right to
procreate as one facet of the right to privacy enumerated in the Griswold case. Following up on the Griswold decision, in a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, the Court
acknowledged that the "right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."9
The Court further stated that this right to privacy is broad enough to
cover the woman's right to choose whether she will continue or terminate a pregnancy.1" However, the Court qualified its holding by
claiming that this right is not absolute and is still subject to limitations
imposed through state regulation.'1

III.

HISTORY OF PROBATION IN GENERAL

One of the most recent and glaring ways the states have been limiting fundamental rights is through the imposition of certain terms of
probation. Probation, also known as "community supervision" in
some states, has long been an alternative to the imposition of criminal
sentences that require imprisonment. The use of probation emerged
long ago during the late nineteenth century, first originating with the
states and then, in the early twentieth century, the federal systems
followed suit.1 2
During this same time period, John Augustus, credited by many as
the "founder of probation in the United States," began bailing people
out of jail and taking responsibility for them as they were released
6. Id. at 484.

7. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
8. Id.

9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
10. Id. at 153.
11. Id.

12. Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/history/beginnings.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services].
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back into the community. 3 However, not everyone was given the opportunity to be one of Augustus's "probationers," as Augustus was
very selective with whom he bailed out. 4 Because this was considered one of the first attempts at releasing offenders into the community under supervision, usually only first-time offenders and those not
"wholly depraved of heart" were given the opportunity to partake in
the program. 15 As a result, probation became recognized by many
courts and state statutes as a rehabilitative, more than a punitive, form
of punishment. 6
A.

Federal ProbationSystem in General

Federal probation did not come about until many years after the
17
states had enacted statutes setting up formal probation systems.
However, prior to the enactment of formal probation in the federal
system in the early twentieth century, the courts were already using
suspended sentences as a form of probation.' In a 1916 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that suspending sentences indefinitely was
unconstitutional and as a result, the legislature enacted the Probation
Act of 1925.'9 Although many bills supporting the imposition of probation statutes were introduced beginning as early as 1909, it was not
until the Probation Act of 1925 that the federal system passed a law
allowing federal courts to suspend sentences and impose a term of
probation.2 °
Currently, federal probation, oftentimes referred to as supervised
release, is subject to the restrictions of certain federal statutes as well
as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the district courts are given wide discretion
when imposing conditions of supervised release. 2' However, such
conditions must meet certain criteria as outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d).22 As with most probation statutes, the federal system can
only impose terms and conditions that are reasonably related to the
factors laid out in section 3583(d). 23 These factors include "(1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the offender; (3) the need for adequate deterrence; (4) the
13. Probation and Parole: History, Goals, and Decision-Making-Origins of Probation and Parole, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1817/Probation-Parole-History-Goals-Decision-Making-Origins-probation-parole.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2001).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 165.
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need to protect society from future crimes of the offender; and (5) the
need to provide rehabilitative services to the offender. ' 24 Historically,
federal courts have focused on factors (3) and (4) when analyzing
whether a condition limiting the liberties of the offender will be upheld or not.2 5 When imposing conditions, the federal courts also must
be careful not to impose conditions that result in a "greater deprivation of liberty than what is reasonably necessary" to meet the specific
goals of probation. 6
B.

State Probation Systems in General

Much like the federal system of supervised release, each state has
implemented a probation system to handle the offenders it releases
into the community each year. Massachusetts became the first state to
implement a system of probation in 1878 and many other states followed its lead and created probation systems in the early twentieth
century. 27 By 1951, all states in the country had some form of a working probation system.2 8
Through their respective legislatures, each state created a statute
requiring judges to impose mandatory conditions on probationers; for
example, offenders are prohibited from committing any other criminal
offense during the term of probation.2 9 Mandatory conditions apply
to all offenders.3" Additionally, many state statutes provide discretionary conditions that the judge may impose at his will. Typically, the
statutes state that the discretionary conditions listed are non-exhaustive and allow for the imposition of any other condition the judge
deems reasonable. 3 The majority of states have followed the approach of the federal system and required that discretionary condi24. Id.
25. See United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
condition that limited access to computers was constitutional because it was related to
deterrence and protecting the public); United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 559-60
(6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that a no-contact condition was constitutional as
it related to rehabilitation and protecting the public); United States v. Trainer, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 589, 594 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a condition limiting involvement with a
particular group is constitutional because it is related to rehabilitation and
deterrence).
26. Paul, 274 F.3d at 165.
27. Beginnings of Probation and Pretrial Services, supra note 12.
28. History of Probation: Origins and Evolution, http://www.spiritus-temporis.
com/probation/history-of-probation-origins-and-evolution.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2009).
29. United States Probation Officer's Role, http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/officer/probation.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2009).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.03(1) (West Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.3(a) (West 2004); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(c) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.540(1)-(2) (2007);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 973.09(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
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tions imposed by a judge must be reasonable and related to the goals
of rehabilitating the offender and protecting the public.3"
IV.

TEXAS PROBATION SYSTEM

Like many other states, Texas created a system of probation
through the legislative enactment of specific statutes designed to oversee the release of offenders into the community.33 Texas's adult probation system, commonly referred to as community supervision, was
essentially created by the 65th legislature in 1977 when they approved
the formation of the Texas Adult Probation Commission.t However,
the Commission was short lived. In 1989, the Texas Legislature consolidated the Commission and a few other agencies into what is now
known as the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).3 5
Under the TDCJ, the Community Justice Assistance Division
(CJAD) is responsible for maintaining and regulating all community
supervision departments throughout the state of Texas.36 These
"CSCD's," as they are commonly referred to, have the direct responsibility of providing community supervision services to the offenders.3 7
Community Supervision Officers have the task of putting together an
adequate rehabilitation plan and providing services that will aid the
offender in rehabilitation.3" Of course, these service plans include all
the conditions stipulated by the court.39
Additionally, Texas trial courts are given immense discretion when
imposing conditions of probation.40 Expressly stated in Article 42.12
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the legislature's intention
that the responsibility of determining the conditions of community supervision be placed wholly within the courts of the state. 41 Texas case
32. Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 314 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d
1128, 1136 (Ct. App. 1984); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979; State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 6; State
v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Oakley 2001 WI 103, 1
11-12, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 459-60, 629 N.W.2d 200, 205-06); Trammell v. State, 751
N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
33. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

34. A History of Texas Community Justice Assistance Division, http://www.lib.
utexas.edu/taro/tslac/20144/tsl-20144.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
35. Id.
36. Tex. Department of Criminal Justice, Community Justice Assistance Division,
What We Do: The Role of the Division, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/cjad/cjad-what.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
37. Texas Department of Community Justice, Community Justice Assistance Division, Who We Serve: Community Supervision and Corrections Departments, http://
www.tdcj.state.tx.us/cjad/cjad-whoserve.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Fielder v. State, 811 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
41. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 42.12 § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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law has continued to hold that the trial courts possess42 the inherent
authority to set all reasonable conditions of probation.
A.

Basic Probation Conditions under Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure,Article 42.12, Section 11

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a judge may impose
any reasonable condition, as long as the condition is designed to protect or restore the victim or community, and is designed to punish,
rehabilitate, or reform the offender.4 3 The Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure also states that the judge may include, but shall not be limited to, any of the basic conditions listed in section 11(a).4 4 The word
"may" implies that the judge has discretion to impose any of the conditions listed, such as not committing any additional criminal offense,
not associating with specified persons, and seeking suitable employment. 45 However, the Texas Legislature expanded the judge's authority by including the phrase "but shall not be limited to" in section 11.
This phrase gives the judge authority to impose any reasonable condition not listed in section 11, so long as the condition is designed to
protect or restore the victim or community and to punish, rehabilitate,
or reform the offender.46
When creating section 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 42.12, the legislature specifically addressed the issue of limiting
the fundamental right to procreate, as brought forth in the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.4 7 Under section
11(f), a judge in Texas may not impose any condition of community
supervision that requires an offender to undergo an "orchiectomy," a
common medical term for castration or sterilization.4 8 Under an
orchiectomy, the ability to reproduce would be terminated and the
offender completely stripped of his fundamental right to procreate
forever.4 9 By adding section 11(f), the legislature expressly forbids
any condition ordering the permanent deprivation of the right to procreate. However, the legislature did not expressly forbid probation
conditions that merely limit or restrict the right to procreate for a
specified period of time.

42. Fielder, 811 S.W.2d at 134.
43. Art. 42.12 § 11(a).
44. Id.
45. Art. 42.12 § 11(a)(1), (3), (6).
46. Art. 42.12 § 11.
47. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
48. Art. 42.12 § 11(f); see also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICrIONARY
952 (3d ed. 1997).
49. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICIONARY, supra note 48.
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B. Length of Probation in Texas
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, section 3(b)(1) allows a judge to impose a maximum term of community supervision of
ten years for felony convictions, subject to the extensions allowed in
section 22(c). 5° Texas is one of the few, if not the only state that allows such a long term of community supervision. 5 Until 2007, Texas
probation terms were on average 67% higher than the average for all
states nationwide.5 2 In 2005, after years of attempts at probation reform, the 79th Legislature passed House Bill 2193 which, among other
things, would have limited the maximum term of probation for certain
third-degree felonies from ten years to five years.53 Governor Perry
vetoed this bill shortly thereafter. 54 Fortunately, this was not the end
for probation reform. In 2007, the Texas Legislature passed House
Bill 1678, which was signed by Governor Perry later that year. 5
House Bill 1678, which took effect on September 1, 2007, slightly
modified the current probation system. 6 As a result of House Bill
1678, the maximum term for probation remained ten years for most
felony offenses, while the maximum term was reduced to five years
for offenses against property and for drug-related offenses.57 Additional revisions made to Article 42.12 provide that the judge is now
required to review the offender's record after the offender serves onehalf of the community supervision term or two years, whichever is
longer.58
Even with the changes made under House Bill 1678 to Article 42.12,
community supervision in Texas has not changed dramatically. Judges
continue to impose ten-year community supervision terms regularly.59
It is only those third-degree felony convictions that fall under Title 7
50. Art. 42.12 §§ 3(b)(1), 22(c).
51. Nolan Hicks & Ingrid Norton, ProbationMay be a Problem in Texas' Criminal
Justice System, THE DAILY TEXAN ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.criminaljustice
coalition.org/files/userfiles/Probation-may-be-a-problem in Texas.pdf.
52. ANN DEL LLANO & ANA YANEZ-CORREA, TEXAS LULAC, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY BRIEF: PROVEN PRO-FAMILY CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES THAT SAVE
FAMILIES, SAVE TAX PAYERS' MONEY AND IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF OUR COMMUNITY 6 (2004), available at http://www.realcostofprisons.org/materials/LULAC.pdf.

53. Tex. H.B. 2193, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
54. Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2193, H.J. of Tex., 79th Leg., R.S. 5899
(2005).
55. Tex. H.B. 1678, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Bailey v. State, No. 09-07-545-2008-CR, 2008 WL 4509353, at *1 (Tex. App.Beaumont Oct. 8, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (imposing
a term of five years community supervision for a conviction of robbery, a Title 7
crime); Vela v. State, No. 05-07-00149-CR, 2008 WL 1704369, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 14, 2008, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (imposing a
term of five years community supervision for possession of methamphetamine and
various other prescription drugs, a Chapter 481 crime).
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of the Texas Penal Code and Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and
Safety Code that have been affected. 60 For those categories of thirddegree felonies, the offender can now only receive a maximum of five
years community supervision, as opposed to the ten-year terms imposed just a year before.6 1
C. Judicial Discretion in Modifying, Reducing, or
Terminating Probation
Even though the length of probation terms have been modified
slightly through House Bill 1678, the judge still maintains discretion in
determining when, if at all, to reduce or terminate the offender's period of community supervision. 6 According to Article 42.12, section
20, at any time after the offender has completed one-third of the imposed sentence, or a period of two years has lapsed, whichever is less,
the original judge has the discretion to reduce or terminate the remaining period of community supervision. 63 Thus, even though Texas
has maximum probation terms higher than most states nationwide, the
judges have the discretion to review the offender's record at the onethird mark and, with the enactment of House Bill 1678, are now required to revisit the original term of community supervision at the
halfway mark.64
With the new requirement of judges to review the offender's community supervision record after one-half of the sentence is completed
or two years, whichever is more, Texas will likely see a drop in the
number of offenders that remain on community supervision for the
entire term. According to the Texas Public Policy Foundation, studies
have shown that once an offender is crime free for a period of seven
years, they are considered only as likely to commit another criminal
offense as a person who has had no criminal activity of record. 65 Additionally, if the offender is crime free for a period of at least five
years, which is the point of review for most offenders that are sentenced to the maximum term of community supervision, the studies
indicate that the likelihood of that offender committing another crime
is merely insignificant compared to someone with no prior criminal
60. Tex. H.B. 1678.
61. Ford v. State, 243 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
ref'd) (imposing a sentence of 10 years community supervision for a conviction of
robbery, a Title 7 offense); Sheldon v. State, No. 12-06-00110-CR, 2006 WL 3459725,
at *1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Dec. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (imposing a 10-year term of community supervision for a conviction of a thirddegree felony DWI, a Chapter 481 offense).
62. Tex. H.B. 1678; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 20 (Vernon Supp.
2008).
63. Art. 42.12 § 20.
64. Tex. H.B. 1678.
65. MARK LEVIN, TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, POLICY PERSPECTIVE:
TEN TALL TALES ABOUT TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS 1 (2008), http://
www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2008-03-PP07-10tales-ml.pdf.
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record.6 6 From this data one can logically conclude that even though
an offender is sentenced to ten years of community supervision, if
they can make it through the first half of the term and complete all the
requirements set forth, the judge may, at his discretion, reduce or
even terminate the remainder of the community supervision.

V.

NATIONAL TREATMENT OF PROBATION CONDITIONS LIMITING
THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE

Although Texas is recognized nationally as a state that is tough on
crime, the Texas courts have not had the opportunity to examine one
major issue that has come up in a few jurisdictions across the country.
In many cases where probation is imposed, at least one of the conditions will limit a basic constitutional right.6 y Whether it be the right to
associate included in the First Amendment or the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure as protected by the Fourth Amendment, the courts have consistently included conditions of probation
that limit these basic human rights.6 8 Many states even include these
conditions as basic conditions of probation that the state applies to all
probationers. 69 A major conflict between courts shows up when the
judge imposes a probation condition that limits the fundamental right
to procreate, an issue that the Texas courts have so far avoided
deciding.
A.

Overturning ProbationConditions that Restrict Procreation

When dealing with a probation condition that limits, or entirely
strips, a person of the fundamental right to procreate, courts across
the nation have been split on the issue of whether such a condition is
constitutional. Most courts have found that the condition is unconstitutional and invalid when dealing with cases that have no connection
to either child abuse or failure to pay child support.7 " However, when
dealing with cases that involve children, mostly through child abuse or
non-support, the courts have taken an entirely different view.
66. Id.
67. See

COMMUNITY JUSTICE ASSISTANCE DIVISION, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TEXAS INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS BENCH MANUAL 22 (2003),

available at

http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/PUBLICATIONS/cjad/Bench-Manual.pdf;
§ 2929.15 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540
(2007); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.09 (West 2007).
68. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
69. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

(1) (West Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.3(a) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE

ANN. § 2951.02(c) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1)-(2) (2003); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 973.09(1)(a) (West Supp. 2003).
70. See United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1992); Wiggins v. State, 386
So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that a trial court may
impose any valid condition which serves a useful rehabilitative purpose.71 In the case of Rodriguez v. State of Florida, a Florida mother
pled to aggravated child abuse for hitting her nine-year-old child and
throwing her against a car, causing injuries to the child.73 The Florida
trial court imposed a ten-year probation term in which Rodriguez was
prohibited from marrying and conceiving.7 4 In addition, the court
prohibited Rodriquez from having custody of any children during the
probationary period.7" Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of
the conditions and the Florida Court of Appeals held that the conditions relating to marriage and procreation, although constitutional, do
not meet the standard that the condition imposed must be reasonably
related to rehabilitation.7 6
The Florida Court of Appeals addressed the issue again about three
years later in the case of Howland v. State of Florida.7 7 Howland was
convicted of negligent child abuse and one of his conditions of probation was that he not father any children during the five-year probation
term.7 8 Like Rodriguez who was not allowed custody, Howland was
not allowed any contact with his child.7 9 In both Rodriguez and Howland, the Florida court stated that the condition prohibiting procreation was constitutional but was not reasonable and is therefore
invalid. 0 The court reasoned that the other imposed conditions
served the purpose of keeping the offender away from children and
thus would prevent future criminality.8 1 Both courts also did not address what they would have ruled if the custody and contact conditions were not imposed. Perhaps the court would have upheld a
condition limiting procreation if the trial court did not impose conditions that limit custody and contact with children.
Merely a year after the Florida court decided Howland, the California Court of Appeals faced a similar case in People v. Pointer.8 2 The
State of California convicted Ruby Pointer of child endangerment and
violating a child custody decree when she refused to take her children
83
off a strictly macrobiotic diet, even at the direction of many doctors.
Pointer's children were eventually removed from her care. Pointer
71.
1978)).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9 (citing Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-10.
Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 919.
Id.
Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9-10; Howland, 420 So. 2d at 919.
Howland, 420 So. 2d at 920; Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10.
People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 1131-32.
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then kidnapped one child and fled the country.8 4 Eventually, Pointer
was brought back to the United States and sentenced to five years
probation with one of the conditions being that she could not conceive
during the probationary period.8 5 The California court first looked at
the reasonableness of the condition, stating that "[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the
crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which
is not reasonably related to future criminality." 6 Upon looking at
these factors, the court stated that the probation condition was reasonable; however, the court also stated that the condition was impermissibly overbroad because less onerous conditions were available.8 7
Indiana courts have also examined the condition of probation that
limits the right to procreate. In 2001, the Indiana Court of Appeals
decided the case of Trammell v. State of Indiana and stated that the
condition ordering Trammell not to become pregnant during her
eight-year probation term excessively impinges on her right to procreate and serves no rehabilitative purpose.88 The State of Indiana convicted Kristie Trammell of neglect of a dependent in the death of her
infant son and sentenced to jail and an eight-year probation term
upon release.8 9 The Indiana court told Trammell that she was not allowed to become pregnant while on probation. 90 The court recognized that it has broad discretion and may impose conditions that
impinge on a probationer's exercise of a constitutionally protected
right. 91 The court did not use a special scrutiny analysis similar to the
California court in Pointer. Instead, the court stated that the condition is analyzed through the balancing of three important factors; "(1)
the purpose probation is supposed to serve, (2) the extent to which the
constitutional rights of law abiding citizens should be given to probationers, and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement." 92 However,
the court did not address each factor individually but instead followed
the analysis of Pointer and held that the condition was overbroad in
that there were less restrictive means of carrying out the purpose of
the condition. 93

84. Id. at 1133.
85. Id.

86. Id. at 1138.
87. Id. at 1138-40.
88. Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
89. Id. at 286.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 289.
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Upholding Probation Conditions that Restrict Procreation

Although the Ohio Supreme Court in State of Ohio v. Talty found
the condition limiting procreation invalid, the analysis in both the majority and the dissenting opinions show that the case may have been
wrongly decided.94 In Talty, the court found the defendant guilty of
not supporting his children and sentenced him to five years of community control, which the Ohio Supreme Court equated to probation. 95
As a condition of Talty's probation, the trial court ordered him to take
all reasonable steps to avoid conceiving another child.9 6 On appeal,
the appellate court agreed with the trial court and held that the condition was constitutional. 97 However, on the subsequent appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court, the condition was struck down as overbroad using the analysis of a prior Ohio Supreme Court case, State v. Jones.9 8
One of the most interesting things about the Talty decision is that although the condition was rendered overbroad, the court did not address whether the condition would have been deemed valid if it
allowed for review or modification once Talty met the other conditions of his probation. 99 The dissenting opinion by Justice Pfeifer
however, addressed this issue quite thoroughly.
Justice Pfeifer, an eleven-year veteran of the Ohio Supreme Court
and one of the dissenting Justices in the Talty decision, was very convincing in his dissenting opinion. Justice Pfeifer stated that the majority mistakenly used the Jones case and instead should have looked
directly at the statutory language of the Ohio community-control statutes to make the decision.1 °° The Ohio community-control statute allows the judge to consider any condition that will protect the public
and punish the offender. 10 1 In doing so, the court should consider the
need for incapacitation, deterrence of the offender, and rehabilitation
of the offender.'0 2 According to Justice Pfeifer, the condition limiting
Talty's procreative rights met all three of these factors.'0 3 Justice Pfeifer also attacked the majority opinion on the overbroad argument and
stated that the Ohio Legislature enacted statutes that specifically provide a mechanism to lift the prohibition, thus rendering moot one of
the major criticisms of the trial court's decision. 0 Talty's condition
could be reduced or terminated on review by the court upon comple94. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 25.
95. Id. 4, 814 N.E.2d at 1202.
96. Id. 4, 814 N.E.2d at 1202.
97. Id. 6, 814 N.E.2d at 1203.
98. Id. 25, 814 N.E.2d at 1207 (using the reasoning of State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d
469 (Ohio 1990)).
99. Id. 21, 814 N.E.2d at 1205.
100. Id. 1$ 30-31, 814 N.E.2d at 1207-08 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
101. Id. 31, 814 N.E.2d at 1208.
102. Id. 31, 814 N.E.2d at 1208.
103. Id. 32, 814 N.E.2d at 1208.
104. Id. 34, 814 N.E.2d at 1209.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

13

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 16 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

tion of a significant amount of his probationary sentence. 10 5 Finally,
Pfeifer addressed the majority's dismissal of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision of State of Wisconsin v. Oakley.10 6 The court in
Oakley, like many federal courts, stated that the standard of reviewstrict scrutiny for most instances of fundamental rights-is merely a
reasonableness standard when involving probation conditions. 107 If
the majority had used the correct standard of review for this situation,
Talty's condition would likely have been upheld. Pfeifer stated, in using the words of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Oakley, that a "condition that infringes on the right to procreate during a term of
community control is not invalid under these facts." 1 8
Although State of Wisconsin v. Oakley received criticism from some
courts, the majority of feedback this controversial decision has received has been positive. Oakley involved a father of nine children by
four different women who intentionally failed to pay child support
and accumulated a large amount of arrearages.' 0 9 The court sentenced Oakley to prison and a five-year term of probation upon release. 110 As a condition of Oakley's probation, the judge stated that
Oakley cannot have any more children without first demonstrating to
the court that he has the ability to support the children he already
has. 11' Upon review, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, stated that the
condition was reasonable and not overly broad." 2 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin agreed and issued one of the two main state-court
opinions-the other state being Oregon-sustaining the constitutionality of probation conditions that limit the fundamental right to
procreate.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized that, through the intention of the legislature in creating such a statute, the trial court is
given broad discretion in imposing individual conditions of probation." 3 In imposing conditions, the court must consider whether the
condition is overly broad and whether the condition is reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation." 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected Oakley's claim that because the condition is a restriction on
his fundamental right to procreate, it should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 1 5 The court reasoned instead that if probation condi105. Id. 34, 814 N.E.2d at 1209.
106. Id. 1 35-36, 814 N.E.2d at 1209-10.
107. Id.
35-36, 814 N.E.2d at 1209-10 (citing State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 16
n.23, 245 Wis. 2d 447,
16 n.23, 629 N.W.2d 200, 16 n.23).
108. Id.
36, 814 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Oakley, 2001 WI 103,
16 n.23, 629
N.W.2d 200, 207).
109. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 9 3, 5, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202.
110. Id. 6, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03.
111. Id. T 6, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03.
112. Id. T17, 629 N.W.2d at 203.
113. Id. 12, 629 N.W.2d at 205.
114. Id. 19, 629 N.W.2d at 209.
115. Id. T91 16-17, 629 N.W.2d at 207-08.
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tions were subject to strict scrutiny, then the court would also be
required to subject more restrictive alternatives, like incarceration, to
strict scrutiny since this obviously infringes on the right to liberty.' 1 6
The court does however recognize that had Oakley not committed a
crime by intentionally refusing to pay child support, his argument
would have some merit.1 1 7 However, because intentional failure to
pay child support is a criminal offense in the state of Wisconsin, the
court recognized the well-established notion that individuals that have
violated the law are not entitled to the same degree of liberty as lawabiding citizens." 8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court then went on to analyze Oakley's
situation using the reasonability standard employed by many other
courts when addressing the issue of probation conditions that infringe
on a fundamental right. 19 In applying the reasonability standard as
opposed to strict scrutiny, the court held that Oakley's fundamental
right to procreate was not unconstitutionally restricted because it did
not completely eliminate Oakley's right to procreate. 2 ° Oakley's condition will expire at the end of his eight-year probation term and at
that time, he is free to have more children. The court stated that the
condition is not overbroad and is in fact narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling state interest of having a parent support the children they
have.1 21 Additionally, the court stated that the condition is reasonably
related to the rehabilitation of Oakley in that the condition will prevent Oakley from adding victims should he continue to refuse to support his children.' 22 Thus, the condition will assist Oakley by banning
him from violating this specific law again. 2 3 Oakley has essentially
been given a chance to conform his conduct to the law, a chance he
may not have had if the judge had imposed a prison sentence instead
of the probation Oakley was granted.
In analyzing the correct standard to use when addressing the constitutionality of Oakley's procreation condition, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court relied in part on State of Oregon v. Kline, a 1998 case that handled the issue of procreation conditions before the Wisconsin courts
did.12 4 Much like Oakley, the Oregon Court of Appeals was faced
with determining the validity of a condition that limited the right of
the defendant to have children until he satisfied certain conditions of
probation.2 5 Tad Kline was sentenced to 36 months probation after
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. 17, 629 N.W.2d at 207.
Id. 17, 629 N.W.2d at 207.
Id. $ 17, 629 N.W.2d at 207.
Id.
19-20, 629 N.W.2d at 209-12.
Id. 20, 629 N.W.2d at 212.
Id. 20, 629 N.W.2d at 212.
Id. 21, 629 N.W.2d at 213.
Id. 21, 629 N.W.2d at 213.
State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 699.
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being convicted of criminal mistreatment in the first degree for the
injuries sustained by his daughter. 12 6 Kline admitted to bruising the
child and fracturing her leg because he was frustrated and "didn't
know his own strength. ' 127 On appeal, the court stated that the probation condition imposed was reasonable in light of the potential of
harm to any children Kline might conceive in the future.128 The court
also stated that the condition was not a permanent ban on Kline's
right to reproduce because Kline has the ability to completely regain
this right with the completion of treatment. 129 The court finally stated
that the protection of the future potential victims allows the fundamental right to be infringed to a permissible degree, as it is here.13°
One thing that the Ohio Supreme Court dissent, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the Oregon Court of Appeals have in common is
the recognition of the need to protect the future victims of the offender. In all three of these cases, children, defenseless by definition,
were the victims of their own biological parents. Without the conditions of probation imposed in these cases, the future children of these
offenders are at greater risk of neglect or abuse. By imposing conditions that limit the right to procreate, the state is acknowledging the
compelling interest of protecting children. By structuring conditions
to allow the offender to earn the right back during the probationary
period, the courts have tailored the condition narrowly enough as to
not completely strip the offender of his fundamental right, thus meeting the reasonability standard necessary to impose such conditions.
C. Why the Split of Authority?
When examining how the states that have struck down procreation
conditions compare to Wisconsin and Oregon, the most glaring difference in the way the courts treated the cases is the scrutiny applied.
Historically, fundamental rights have been subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis when the rights are infringed.'
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court must show that there is a compelling governmental interest and the condition must be narrowly tailored to promote that
interest. 132 However, many states have recognized that the offender is

not afforded the same protection of fundamental rights as the law
abiding citizen. 133 As a result, many states have created their own
tests for determining whether a probation condition that violates a
fundamental right is valid.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(2001).

Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
Id.
State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 17, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 117, 629 N.W.2d 200,
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While all states require that the condition be reasonably related to
the rehabilitation of the offender, not all states have employed the
same methods of analysis to reach their decisions. In Florida, the
courts require that in addition to the reasonable analysis, the condition must not be unduly restrictive of liberty or freedom."' In Indiana, the court stated that the purpose of the condition must not be
attainable by alternative restrictions less subversive of the imposed
condition.1 35 California actually calls its test the "special scrutiny" test
and requires the condition be narrowly drawn, very similar to the
strict scrutiny analysis used for non-offenders. 13 6 And finally, in Talty,
the Ohio Supreme Court went ahead and used the strict scrutiny analysis when reviewing Talty's probation condition. 3 7 However, as
pointed out in the dissent, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the wrong
standard and thus, the courts should have held that the condition was
not overbroad and thus permissible.' 3 8
Alternatively, when looking at the analysis of Oakley and Kline, it
seems that the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Oregon Court of
Appeals used the correct scrutiny analysis when reviewing the conditions in question. Wisconsin used the "reasonability standard" when
reviewing the condition limiting Oakley's fundamental right to procreate. 139 However, when looking at the condition, the court used a
higher scrutiny and found that even though strict scrutiny is not required, the condition still met the strict scrutiny standard of being narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest. 4 ° In Kline, the
court simply rejected Kline's argument that strict scrutiny was needed
when reviewing probation conditions that limit fundamental rights.' 4 '
The court went on to say that as long as the condition did not impose
a total ban, it infringed on the fundamental rights to a permissible
degree. 4 2
Looking at the years in which these cases were decided, it seems
that the reasonability standard is becoming the modern trend. With
Kline and Oakley being decided in 1998 and 2001 respectively, only
Ohio, in the 2004 Talty decision, has produced an opinion that has
ruled the opposite way since then. And if the Ohio Supreme Court
employed the correct standard when determining the constitutionality
of Talty's probation condition, as the dissent did in their analysis, the
134.
135.
136.
137.
16-20.
138.
139.
200,
140.
141.
142.

Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201,
Id. T 34, 814 N.E.2d at 1209 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 19-20, 245 Wis. 2d 447,
19-20 (2001).
Id. 19-20, 629 N.W.2d at 209-12.
State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
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court would have likely upheld the condition.143 This merely shows
that courts are becoming more and more aware of the need for conditions that limit basic fundamental rights, when warranted by the conduct of the offender of course.
VI.

TEXAS COURTS' STAND ON LIMITING FUNDAMENTAL
THROUGH PROBATION

RIGHTS

In September 2008, in the Travis County court located in Austin,
Texas, District Judge Charlie Baird sentenced Felicia Salazar to a
community supervision term of ten years for failing to provide protection and medical care for her then 19-month-old daughter. 144 The
child's father, Roberto Alvarado, was sentenced to 15 years in prison
for beating the child so severely that she suffered broken bones and
other injuries.14 The mother in this case, Salazar, did nothing to obtain medical care for her child after the beating. The child has recovered from her horrific injuries, and the146
parental rights of Salazar and
Alvarado have since been terminated.
Salazar was charged with injury to a child by omission and in addition to the standard terms of community supervision, Salazar was told
to stop having children for her ten-year probationary period. 147 When
confronted by the media about his decision to impose such a term,
Judge Baird recognized Salazar's fundamental right to reproduce and
thus could not order her to be sterilized. 148 However, Judge Baird
justified the imposition of the condition because under Texas
law,
1 49
"judges can impose any condition, so long as it is reasonable. 1
Even though Salazar's case provides no precedential value to Texas,
because it is only a district court decision and thus is not mandatory
authority for Texas courts to follow, it seems likely a similar issue will
come up sometime in the near future. Neither Salazar, nor her attorney, objected at the time the condition was imposed. 5 ° InTexas, conditions not objected to at trial are accepted as terms of the contract
that is community supervision.151 Thus, because Salazar, nor her attorney, objected at the trial court level, the court will not address the
constitutionality of the condition should Salazar decide to appeal at a
later time.
143. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, TJ 35-36
(Pfeifer, J.,dissenting).
144. Steven Kreytak, Judge Orders Woman Not to Have Any More Kids, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 12, 2008, at Al.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.

148.
149.
150.
151.

Slater, supra note 1.
Id.
Slater, supra note 2.
Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
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How has Texas Handled Restrictions on Fundamental Rights in
the Past?

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure defines community supervision
as a suspension of a sentence.1 52 The courts have gone on to state that
community supervision is an arrangement in lieu of a sentence, not a
part of a sentence.1 5 3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Speth
v. State, held that when community supervision is granted, it creates a
contractual relationship between the offender and the court.' 54 The
court went on to say that because of the contractual nature of probation in Texas, an offender can affirmatively waive unreasonable terms
by entering into a probation contract without objection. 1 55 Because
the Texas courts have held that the community supervision agreement
is more of a contract between the offender and the court, and not a
sentence under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, when an offender agrees to complete community supervision,
he or she is agree156
ing to the terms set forth in the contract.
Texas courts have had the opportunity to address many different
fundamental rights cases, using three main factors in determining if
the conditions are valid or not. Such factors include whether the condition is related to the crime, whether the condition related to conduct
that is not in and of itself criminal, and whether the condition forbids
conduct not reasonably related to the future criminality of the offender.' 5 7 Using this analysis, the courts have many times held conditions of probation that limit constitutional rights valid.
In the Texas Court of Appeals case of Marcum v. State of Texas, the
appellant argued that his First Amendment right to associate was unreasonably infringed when the trial court placed a condition of probation that required appellant have no contact with anyone under the
age of 17.158 Because the appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child, the court stated that the condition satisfied all
three factors laid out above. 1 59 As recently as 2004, in the case of Belt
v. State of Texas, the Texas Court of Appeals once again reviewed a
no-contact condition requiring an offender convicted of aggravated
160
sexual assault to have no contact with children under 18 years old.
The court stated that the condition was valid as it directly related161to
the offense and relates to the future criminality of the defendant.
152. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 2(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
153. Id. art. 42.12 § 3(a).
154. Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 533.
155. Id. at 534.
156. Id. at 533.
157. Marcum v. State, 983 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
pet. ref'd).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
161. Id. at 286.
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When the Texas Court of Appeals decided Belt, they used the analysis from an earlier case that looked at the reasonableness of a probation condition that limited the Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. In McArthur v. State of Texas,

decided in 1999, the appellant was convicted of indecency with a child
and placed on ten years community supervision. 162 As a condition of
his community supervision, McArthur was required to allow the community supervision officer to search and seize any sexually explicit
materials in his possession.16 3 The court held, using the three factors

listed above, that the condition was valid and reasonably related to his
future criminality.164
In another Texas Court of Appeals case, Ex Parte Renfro, the court
held that a condition of probation requiring that the appellant take
polygraph exams was reasonable and not a violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination. 165 Renfro was convicted
of indecency with a child and was placed on community supervision
for ten years. 6 6 Renfro claimed the polygraph condition violated his
Fifth Amendment right and should thus be held invalid. The court
disagreed and, using the three factors in Marcum, held that the polygraph helps monitor compliance and is thus reasonably related to
Renfro's crime."'
In all these cases, the court has upheld a condition of probation that
so obviously infringes on a constitutionally protected right. In each of
the Texas cases, the condition was not worded in a manner that allows
for the condition to be removed once a certain event takes place. The
condition will be imposed for the entire period of community supervision and will only be modified or terminated upon successful completion of the term or petition to the court allowed under Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure article 42.12, section 20.168 However, in the cases
discussed regarding the imposition of conditions that limit the fundamental right to procreation, the courts have stated that a mechanism
for which the prohibition can be lifted should be included or the condition will be deemed overbroad. 169 Why then do the courts allow for
other rights to be restricted without such a mechanism in place? Have
the courts put the fundamental right to procreate above all other constitutionally protected rights? Possibly. However, because Texas has
162. McArthur v. State, 1 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd
2000).
163. Id. at 330.
164. Id. at 333.
165. Ex Parte Renfro, 999 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
pet. ref'd 2000).
166. Id. at 559.
167. Id. at 560.
168. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 42.12 § 20 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
169. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St. 3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, $$ 35-36
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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not been faced with the task of determining whether conditions that
limit the fundamental right to procreate are valid, we will have to wait
and see which approach the courts will follow.
B.

How Should Texas Handle Restrictions on the Fundamental
Right to Procreate in the Future?

With conflicting case law from other states, and no Texas cases on
point, it would be interesting to know how Texas would have handled
Ms. Salazar's case had she appealed. Should Texas follow the lead of
other states that have held the conditions invalid? Or maybe follow
the lead of Oregon and Wisconsin and hold the conditions valid.
There seems to be two clear paths that make sense for when Texas
courts are faced with this tough decision in the future.
First, as pointed out above, Texas has many times dealt with the
issue of fundamental rights being encroached through probation, or
community supervision conditions. It has been recognized throughout
the country that a probationer is only entitled to conditional liberty
dependent on certain imposed conditions. 17 0 The trial courts in Texas
have long used this notion when imposing conditions of probation. In
the future, should the Texas courts be faced with the task of determining if a probation condition that limits the right to procreate is valid, it
would seem quite reasonable for them to analogize that case with the
many other cases discussed above. If Salazar had appealed her case,
and the court does analogize, it would seem the only reasonable holding the court could make would be to find the condition a valid exercise of judicial discretion and a valid condition of probation.
A reasonable alternative route is to follow the analysis of the dissenting opinion of Justice Pfeifer in State of Ohio v. Talty. Even
though the offender in Talty is a father who failed to support his children, and Salazar is a mother who failed to provide medical care for
her daughter, the two cases are very similar. 7 ' As Justice Pfeifer
points out, the main reason the majority deemed the condition invalid
was that there was no explicit mechanism for terminating the condition had the relevant conduct changed.' 7 2 Justice Pfeifer then points
out the statutory mechanism that is in place in Ohio, much like that
statutory mechanism in place in Texas. Under these statutes, the offender is entitled to petition the court for modification or termination
of the condition of probation upon showing that she has completed
the other requirements imposed. 1 73 Because of this statute, the courts
170.
(citing
171.
172.
ing).
173.

McArthur v. State, 1 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)
United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, T 2, 814 N.E.2d at 1202; Kreytak, supra note 144.
Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, 1 35-36, 814 N.E.2d at 1209-10 (Pfeifer, J., dissentOHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); TEX. CODE

CRIM. PRoc. ANN.

art. 42.12 § 20 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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should not be required to explicitly state in the condition the means
for overcoming it. It is already established that the right exists in the
statutory law.
Finally, for all the courts who have stated that the condition causes
major problems with enforcement, that is not necessarily the case. By
simply adding the condition, courts are trying to proactively stop the
offender from committing another crime. If the courts tell the offender she will be in violation of her probation upon having more children, this does not coerce termination of the pregnancy, or abortion.
Should the offender become pregnant or father another child, most
courts would simply impose alternate conditions, such as parenting
classes and medical care.1 74 It is highly unlikely, and absolutely a violation of procreative rights, for the court to coerce or order abortion
of the fetus.'7 5 In addition, the offender would likely not even be sub-

ject to a probation revocation resulting in jail time. 176 Texas case law
has shown that first time violators, whose violation is a technical violation and not a criminal violation, like committing another crime, have
been shown leniency and not had their probation immediately
revoked.

7

Therefore, if the unfortunate case against Felicia Salazar had ever
reached the Texas Court of Appeals, it would be reasonable for the
court to have upheld the condition that Salazar not become pregnant
during her probation term. Judge Baird, by no means, stripped
Salazar of her right to procreate forever because she can petition for
modification after one third of her sentence is complete. 78 He is simply imposing a condition of probation that satisfies all three factors
laid out in Marcum.'7 9 The condition relates to the crime Salazar was
convicted of because if she is allowed to have more children, they will
automatically be in danger simply by being born. The condition relates to conduct that is criminal because if Salazar is allowed to have
children, the likelihood of her failing to provide adequate care is very
high. And finally, the condition relates to the future criminality of
Salazar because so long as she is not allowed to have more children,
the chances of her failing to provide care for them are very slim. Because the condition meets this test, the court, if ever faced with a case
174. Contra State v. Mosberg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
175. Id. at 315 (citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
176. Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
177. Id. at 706 (allowing four violations before community supervision was revoked); see also Brooks v. State, 153 S.W.3d 124, 125 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no
pet.) (allowing three violations of community supervision before revocation); Eisen v.
State, 40 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (allowing 5 violations
before revocation of probation); Gonzalez v. State, No. 05-02-01716-CR, 2003 WL
22072692, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 8, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (allowing four violations before revocation of probation).
178. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 20 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
179. Marcum v. State, 983 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
pet. ref'd).
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similar to Salazar, should uphold the condition as a valid exercise of
judicial discretion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When looking at the history of probation over the years, it seems
that the trends are moving toward a more restrictive means of allowing an individual to remain in the community, under the watchful
eye of the government. With jails and prisons becoming more and
more overcrowded by the day, probation, community supervision, or
community control, whichever term is preferred, is used more frequently. Each state has enacted statutes to regulate the imposition of
probation conditions as well as give the judge a very wide discretionary power when it comes to imposing those conditions. This discretion is apparent in the large number of judges that have imposed
conditions that limit the fundamental rights of the probationers.
The right to procreate, a fundamental right that has long been recognized through the right to privacy, is definitely a gray area when it
comes to probation conditions. Is it constitutional to restrict this
right? Is it constitutional to limit this right? Although the majority of
courts have held probation conditions that limit procreation invalid,
Wisconsin and Oregon are leading the trend in finding that limiting
the right to procreate is a reasonable and valid exercise of judicial
discretion in imposing probation conditions.
Felicia Salazar, although not aware of it at the time, could have
been a pivotal player in Texas probation history. By imposing a condition of probation that restricts her right to procreate, Judge Baird essentially stripped Salazar of a right so fundamental to life that on the
surface, one would automatically assume Judge Baird abused his discretion as a Judge and thus the condition should be invalid. This is
simply not the case. Judge Baird merely exercised his statutorily given
power and imposed a reasonable condition that related to Salazar's
crime, her rehabilitation, and the protection of the public. Judge
Baird acted as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did, as the Court of
Appeals of Oregon did, and as the Supreme Court of Ohio should
have done through Justice Pfeifer's dissent. However, because no objection to the condition was made at Salazar's trial, Texas will have to
wait for another Judge to step up and impose a reasonable, although
somewhat controversial, condition limiting the right to procreate.
Maybe the future defendant will object next time around and give the
Texas courts the opportunity to firmly establish precedent allowing for
the reasonable imposition of probation conditions that limit the fundamental right to procreate.
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